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Introduction
For more than eleven years, Regulation (EC) 44/2001 (the 'Brussels I Regulation'),1
which succeeded the '1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforce-
ment of judgments', has been one of the most relevant pieces of legislation in the
European Union (EU),2 and has established a European judicial area with uniform
rules on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of civil judgments. It is based
on the mutual trust of the Member States in each other legal systems and judicial
institutions3 and on the principle of legal certainty.
4
The Brussels I Regulation applies to all proceedings in "civil or commercial matters".'
For the purpose of the subsequent analysis, it seems useful to remind that, in laying
down rules allocating jurisdiction, the Brussels I Regulation affirms the general
principle 'actor sequiturforum rei'.6 In compliance with this principle, the jurisdiction
is to be exercised by the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled (Article
2). Special rules of jurisdiction are listed in Articles 5-8, and provide the claimant
with additional options on where to sue a defendant. The Court of Justice of the
European Union (the 'CJEU') has emphasised that these special rules "must be
strictly interpreted and cannot be given an interpretation going beyond the cases
expressly envisaged" by the Brussels I Regulation itself.7 Article 8 and subsequent
provisions concern jurisdiction in specified areas (insurance, consumer contracts,
and employment contracts): they are aimed to protect certain categories of litigants
* LLB, PhD (University of Verona); LLM (Dub); Attorney-at-Law (Verona).
1 [2001] OJ L12/1. The Brussels Convention of 1968 continues to apply only with respect to
those territories of EU countries that fall within its territorial scope and that are excluded
from the regulation pursuant to Article 355 TFEU. To parties seated in Norway, Iceland
and Switzerland, the Lugano Convention is applicable (Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [1988] OJ L 319/9).
Peter Arnt Nielsen, "The new Brussels I Regulation" (2013) Common Market Law Review 503.
Recital 16 of the Preamble. See also C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR 1-3565.
Case 38/81 Effer [1982] ECR 825, para 6.
On the meaning of "civil and commercial matters" see ex pluribus Case C-645/11 Land Berlin
v Ellen Mirjam Sapir and others [2013] not yet published.
6 Inter alia, David Joseph, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement (Sweet
and Maxwell, 2010), 20; Ugo Patroni Griffi, Manuale di di Diritto commercial Internazionale
(Giuffre Editore, 2012), 474.
7 Case C-168/02 Kronhofer [2004] ECR 1-6009, para 14 and case law cited. See also Case
C-440/97 GIE Groupe Concorde and Others [1999] ECR 1-6307, para 24.
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who are seen to be in a weaker position than their adversary.8 Notably, Article 22
provides for cases of exclusive jurisdictions (in proceedings concerning rights in
rem in immovable property; the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dis-
solution of companies or other legal persons; the validity of entries in public regis-
ters; IPRs; enforcement of judgments).
The Brussels I Regulation also contains a specific provision that recognises 'choice
of court' agreements. Article 23(1) provides that:
"[i]f the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a Member State, have
agreed that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdic-
tion to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in con-
nection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall
have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have
agreed otherwise".
Once the jurisdiction in the terms of Article 23 has been established, its effects are
to exclude the application of Article 2 and Articles 5 et seq.9
Articles 27-30 provide for rules to solve conflicts of jurisdictions to avoid irrecon-
cilable decisions in case of parallel proceedings, i.e. proceedings which concern or
the same or different, but related, causes of actions.0 In the first case, known as
lis alibi pendens, identical proceedings are commenced in different jurisdictions. In
the second case, actions in which there is some form of relevant connection among
the causes of action are commenced in different jurisdictions.1 Parallel proceedings
can occur also when an exclusive jurisdiction clause exists: while a party brings an
action in the chosen court, or the chosen court may be seised to decide the merits of
the case, proceedings in a non-chosen court may be commenced by another party
e.g. to question the validity or the existence of a jurisdiction clause.
According to Article 27:
"where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties12 are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other
than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such
time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established",
s Recital 13 of the Preamble.
Joseph (n 5), 29.
'
0 Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti, 'Lis Alibi Pendens and Related Actions in Civil and
Commercial Matters within the European Judicial Area' (2009) Yearbook of Private International
Law, 511, 512.
"Marongiu Buonaiuti (n 9), 512.
The requirement that both proceedings must be between the same parties has been inter-
preted by the CJEU as there is no need that the parties have the same procedural position in
both cases. Therefore, parties in a case can be considered the 'same' as another case even if the
parties are not legally identical, so long as they have the same legal interest (Case C-351/96
Drouot Assurances SA v Metallurgical Industries and Ors case [1996] ECR 1-375).
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and
"where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other
than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court".
In case of proceedings which are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and
determine them together, to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments, the court of
a Member State second seised may stay (i.e. has the faculty, but is not obliged) its
proceedings in favour of the first seised court in related actions (Article 28).
The civil law concept of lis pendens adopted by the Brussels I Regulation to deter-
mine which Member State's court is the most appropriate venue for litigation and
to solve conflicts of jurisdiction is unambiguous and highly predictable. However,
the strict interpretation given by the Court of Justice (CJEU) of the rule according
to which the second seised court must give priority to the court first seised in time,
regardless of the closest connection between the forum and the dispute, or the
intention of the parties, has enabled the parties to bypass 'choice of court' agree-
ments, in order to delay the final enforceable decision (so called 'Italian torpedo'),
and even to avoid enforcement of adverse arbitration awards.
To prevent (or, more realistically, to reduce) the unfortunate abuse of these litiga-
tion tactics (stigmatized in the Heidelberg Report on the application of the Brussels
I Regulation),13 a new regulation, the Brussels I Recast Regulation, was passed in
December 2012 and will enter into force in January 2015.14
This article will examine the abusive litigation tactics that have developed under
the Brussels I Regulation and will then examine whether the amendments and the
new provisions adopted by the Brussels I Recast might be deemed, at least poten-
tially, adequate to prevent these tactics. Further to these introductory remarks, this
article is divided into other four sections. Section 2 focuses on the application of
the lis pendens rule in case of 'choice of court' agreements, in light of the Gasser
decision.15 It also discusses to what extent the CJEU's judgement encourages a
party to evade a valid jurisdiction agreement and to seise a judge in a different
Member State. Section 3 analyses how the duty to proceed (and the limited discre-
tion of a court of a Member States on whether deciding a case) can infringe an arbi-
tration agreement in light of the West Takers case.16 Section 4 critically analyses the
relevant provisions of the Brussels I Recast to prevent these abusive tactics. Even if
the complexity and interrelation of the amendments introduced by the Brussels I
Recast would require a lengthier and surely more in-depth investigation, we limit
ourselves to focus on the lis pendens rule and on the renewed exclusion of arbitra-
tion. Section 5 concludes.
13Http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study-application-brussels 1 en.pdf
(accessed 1 May 2013).
14 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 [2012] OJ L351/1.
"Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser GmbH v MISAT SrI [2003] ECR 1-14693.
16Case C-185/07 Allianz SpA v West Tankers Inc [2009] ECR 1-663.
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'Choice of Court' Agreements and Torpedo Claims
One of the major problems developed under the Brussels I Regulation is the abuse
of the lis pendens rule to bypass 'choice of court' agreements. Such an abuse has
been to some extent 'allowed' by the interpretation of Article 27 given by the CJEU.
The seminal case in this respect is Gasser.17 It concerned an Austrian company,
Gasser, and an Italian distributor, MISAT, which had entered into a contract for
the sale of goods. The contract did not contain any 'choice of court' agreements.
However, subsequent invoices sent by Gasser contained an exclusive jurisdiction
clause indicating Austrian courts as competent. When a dispute arose, MISAT
commenced a proceeding before a court in Rome for a declaration that the contract
had been terminated. After the Italian Court had been seised, Gasser brought a pro-
ceeding before the Austrian Court, indicated in the jurisdiction clause printed on
the invoices. MISAT contested the validity of this 'choice of court' agreement and
argued that it was for the Italian Court to decide this matter as court first seised.
MISTAT relied on former Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (Article 27 of the
Brussels I Regulation), i" which, as mentioned above, requires any court other than
the court first seised to stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first
seised is established. Pursuant to this rule, the Austrian Court decided to stay its
proceedings and wait for the Italian Court's decision. Gasser appealed to a higher
Austrian Court which referred for preliminary ruling to the CJEU and asked, inter
alia, whether Article 27:
"must be interpreted as meaning that, where a court is the second court
seised and has exclusive jurisdiction under an agreement conferring juris-
diction, it may, by way of derogation from that article, give judgment in the
case without waiting for a declaration from the court first seised that it has
no jurisdiction"."
The Court also asked whether the lis pendens rule may be derogated, in cases in
which the duration of proceedings before the court first seised is excessively and
unjustifiably long.
The CJEU confirmed that the lis pendens rule requires a national court sec-
ond seised to suspend proceedings until the court first seised has established
17 See supra n 14.
SIn so far as the Brussels I Regulation replaces the Convention of 27 September 1968 on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ([1978] OJ L
304/36), as amended by the successive accession conventions for the new Member States,
in the relations between Member States, the interpretation provided by the Court in respect
of the provisions of that convention is also valid for those of the regulation whenever the
provisions of those instruments may be regarded as equivalent (see, inter alia, Case C-133/11
Folien Fischer and Fofitec [2012] not yet published, para 31). On the interrelation between the
Brussels Convention and the Brussels I regulation: Carlo Bonaduce, "L'interpretazione della
convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968 alla luce del regolamento n. 44/2001 nelle pronunce della
Corte di giustizia" (2003) Rivista di diritto Internazionale 746.19Para 28.
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or declined jurisdiction, even if the court seized second was nominated by an
agreement which is valid under Article 23. The European judges strictly applied
the chronological rule provided for in Article 27. They stated that where there
is an agreement conferring jurisdiction, the parties always have the option of
declining to invoke it and the defendant has the option of entering an appear-
ance before the court first seised, without alleging that it lacks jurisdiction on
the basis of a 'choice of court' agreement. According to the CJEU, it is incumbent
only on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement and even-
tually to decline jurisdiction. 2 Moreover, the CJEU rejected the argument that
an excessive length of proceedings before the court first seised may create any
exception to the application of the lis pendens rule. The Brussels I Regulation does
not envisage any such exception, and if it were to be created it would undermine
mutual trust in each other's legal systems and judicial institutions, which is at
the basis of the Regulation. 21
Gasser is considered by many scholars and common law practitioners a product of
a very formal approach, "the one which prized (legitimately, if awkwardly), logic
above consequences, theory above practice".22 It represents for them a "victory of
formality", 23 with detrimental practical effects, because gives a party the possibility
to commence proceedings in breach of a jurisdiction agreement and prevent the
other party from instituting the proceedings before the designated court. In this
respect, Lord Mance stated:
"It may comfort theoreticians that the Community has rules of ideological purity
and logical certainty. But the result can only be practical uncertainty, with large
scope for tactical manoeuvring". 24
In other words, the interpretation given by CJEU has been severely criticized
because it opens the field to 'torpedo' claims, especially claims for negative
declaratory relief in no-chosen courts. It gives the possibility to litigants, acting
in bad faith, to frustrate choice of court clauses, in view of delaying the resolution
of the dispute in the forum chosen by the parties, by first seising a non-compe-
tent court. Since across Europe the length of proceedings is not uniform, the strict
application of the lis pendens advocated by the CJEU allows to "use" slow courts
to "sink" legitimate proceedings in Member States having jurisdiction. 25
0Para 54.
1Para 72. The CJEU underlined the importance of the concept of mutual trust also in subse-
quent cases(e.g. Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit [2004] ECR 1-3565).
Richard Fentiman, "Case note on Gasser" (2005) Common Market Law Review 241, 251.
3Petr Briza, "Choice-of-Court Agreements: Could the Hague Choice of Court Agreements
Convention and the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation Be the Way Out Of The Gasser-
Owusu Disillusion?" [2009] Journal of Private International Law 537, 543, et seq.
"Lord Mance, "Exclusive Jurisdiction Agreements and European Ideals" (2004) LQR 357,
360, cited in Jonathan Harris, "The Brussels I Regulation and the Re-Emergence of the English
Common Law" (2008) The European Legal Forum 181.
5Inter alia Michal Bogdan, "The Brussels/Lugano Lis pendens Rule and the 'Italian
Torpedo"' (2008) Scandinavian Studies in Law 90. Felix Blobel and Patrick Spath, "The Tale
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Notably, whereas the negative practical consequences brought by the Gasser
decision have been widely acknowledged, other scholars sympathize with the
CJEU's reasoning. According to Steinle and Vasiliades:
"[f]rom a legal perspective, it was necessary and correct to uphold the lis pendens
principle, since it is impossible for a court to find an exception in the lis pendens
rule if the Regulation provides none".26
According to Bogdan:
"to allow the courts of one Member State to review the jurisdiction of the courts in
other Member States could lead to chaos and undermine not only the jurisdictional
rules but also the rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments".2
Leading Italian scholars did not share the criticism on the CJEU's decision, too.
Among others, Marinelli has welcomed the Gasser judgment as a sound inter-
pretation of the Brussels I Regulation, that guarantees legal certainty and mutual
trust among the Member States. 28 According to this author, the Court could not
have interpreted the lis pendens rule but in this way. In addition, perhaps in a
'nationalistc' way, Marinelli and one of the most outstanding Italian civil procedure
experts, Consolo, 29 have stigmatised the argument advanced by the Austrian Court
(and sustained by the Government UK as pars interveniens in front of the CJEU)
according to which the length of proceedings should be conceived as a reason to
derogate to Article 27. They welcomed the decision of the CJEU in this respect.
Both the Authors underline that mutual trust is the basis of judicial cooperation
and cannot be disregarded. In addition, they highlight that the 'torpedo claims' can
be easily blocked by Italian courts themselves through the preliminary objection
of jurisdiction procedure provided for in Article 41 of the Italian Civil Procedure
Code (regolamento di giurisdizione).
All in all, the practical disadvantages of the interpretation given by the CJEU in
the Gasser case could not be denied. However, it seems that the CJEU could hardly
have given a different interpretation of the clear and straightforward rule set forth
in Article 27. It is not a matter of formalistic approach: interpretation must be rooted
in the text. By contrast, the interpretation somewhat suggested by the Austrian
court would have neglected the formulation of the provision. In this respect, Gasser
of Multilateral Trust and the European Law of Civil Procedure" (2005) European Law Review
528, 532.6Jonas Steinle and Evan Vasiliades, "The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements under
the Brussels I Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy" (2010) Journal of
Private International Law 565, 571.
17 Bogdan (n 25). See also Felix Blobel and Patrick Spath, "'The Tale of Multilateral Trust and
the European Law of Civil Procedure" (2005) European Law Review 528, 532.
8Marino Marinelli, "Litispendenza comunitaria, clausola di proroga esclusiva e durata irra-
gionevole del processo preveniente" (2004) Giurisprudenza Italiana 69, 73.
29 Claudio Consolo, "La Italian Torpedo non fa naufragare per la seconda volta la petroliera
Erika e la buona fede processual-internazionalistica (grazie al "ricarburato" e non piu vitu-
perando nostro regolamento di giurisdizione)" (2003) Int'l Lis 97.
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is anchored both to the text and system of the Brussels I Regulation and Gasser's
rationale has been confirmed in subsequent cases, 30 such as Turner and Owusu.
31
It also appears that it is the extensive length of proceedings before some courts that
confers the torpedo action a detrimental effect. However, to allow a derogation of the
lis pendens rule in cases in which the duration of trials before the court first seised is
excessively long would open the field to a large discretion of the court second seised
and would seriously weaken the principles of legal certainty and mutual trust. When
is a proceeding excessively long? Which parameters must be taken into account to
consider the length? Is a national court of a Member State really in the position to
consider and judge over other Member States' procedural rules? These questions are
open ones. National courts could adopt different positions, ultimately undermin-
ing the uniform application of the Brussels I Regulation. Thus, on the one hand, the
solution to overcome 'torpedo' actions should be achieved amending the Article 27
(which has been done through the new Brussels I Recast, as will be examined below).
On the other hand, the danger of the 'torpedo' could be neutralized through a deeper
integration and 'harmonization' among the legal systems of the Member States.
Abusive Litigation Tactics To Bypass Arbitration Clauses
Unlike many other areas of commercial law, Member States enjoy a very broad free-
dom in matters of arbitration. This is so because the most important international
instrument in this field, the New York Convention,32 to which all the Member States
are parties, does not provide for a complete regulation of arbitration and of arbi-
tration-related court litigation: thereby it leaves most issues to be determined by
national law. More than that, this is so because arbitration has remained outside the
scope of EU rules. The Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation provides for an
exclusion as regard to arbitration. The scope of this exclusion has been subject to an
intensive debate, but the CJEU has been clear in affirming, inter alia in Marc Rich,33
that the 'arbitration exception' applies not only to arbitration proceedings, but also to
court proceedings in which the subject matter is arbitration.
The lack of harmonised jurisdictional criteria applicable to arbitration-related
proceedings:
"means that in principle there is no certainty as to which Member State courts
will have jurisdiction over the different types of proceedings that may be
30Briza (n 23).
31Turner cited supra (n 21); C-281/02 Andrew Owusu v NB Jackson and Others [2005] ECR
1-1383. This case, according to Briza (n 23) may lead to the conclusion that the court of the
defendant's domicile is not permitted to decline its jurisdiction under Art 2 of the Brussels
Convention/Regulation on the basis of a jurisdiction agreement in favour of a non-Member
State (agreements which are not covered by Art 23) and ultimately frustrates party autonomy
and the principle pacta sunt servanda. See also Richard Fentiman, "Civil Jurisdiction and Third
States: Owusu and After" (2006) Common Market Law Review 705.
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 June
1958 at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/ arbitration/ NYConvention.
html (accessed 20 May 2013).
33Case C-190/89 Rich [1991] ECR 1-3855; Case C-391/95 Van Uden [1998] ECR 1-7091.
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brought before a domestic court in relation to a given arbitration agreement or
arbitration proceedings".4
These include proceedings for the granting of measures in support of arbitration
(e.g. appointing or replacing arbitrators, evidentiary and provisional measures)
and proceedings relating to the validity of arbitration agreements and to the valid-
ity of arbitral awards (typically setting aside proceedings).
One of the main disputed issues is the interrelation between the Brussels
I Regulation and arbitration,35 and, in particular, the possibility of 'torpedo claims'
aimed to question the existence, validity, scope of effects of a arbitration agreement.
Again, it is plain that these actions have been somewhat 'allowed' by the CJEU.
The seminal case in this respect (in the 'Gasser-line"'36 ) is Allianz SpA (formerly
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtd SpA) and Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West
Tankers Inc, which has spurred a surfeit of commentary.37 The case originated after
a vessel owned by West Tankers and chartered by Erg Petroli Spa collided with
a jetty owned by Erg in Italy Erg claimed compensation from their insurances
Allianz and Generali and began arbitration proceedings in London for recovery of
the excess. West Tankers denied any liability. After compensation had been paid to
Erg, Allianz and Generali launched court proceedings against West Tankers in Italy
to recover the sum they paid to Erg. West Tankers alleged that the court in Italy had
no jurisdiction because of the validly concluded arbitration agreement. In addition,
West Tankers filed a proceedings in the United Kingdom for an anti-suit injunction,
to restrain Allianz and Generali from continuing their action in Italy. The House of
Lords issued a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU and asked:
"whether it is incompatible with Regulation No 44/2001 for a court of a Mem-
ber State to make an order to restrain a person from commencing or continuing
proceedings before the courts of another Member State on the ground that such
proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration agreement, even though Article
1(2)(d) of the regulation excludes arbitration from the scope thereof"."
The CJEU, in substance, was asked to rule on the compatibility of anti-suit
injunctions39 with the Brussels I Regulation.
34 Luca Radicati di Brozolo, "Arbitration and the Draft Revised Brussels I Regulation: Seeds Of
Home Country Control And Of Harmonisation?" (2011) Journal of Private International Law, 423,
at 426.
35Jonathan Harris and Eva Lein, "A Neverending Story? Arbitration and the Brussels I: The
Recast"' in Eva Lein, The Brussels I Review Uncovered (BIICL, 2012) 31.
36 Briza (n 23), 540 et seq.
17See supra n 17.
38Para 19.
"For a succinct analysis on the use of anti-suit injunctions in English courts see Patrizio
Santomauro, 'Sense And Sensibility: Reviewing West Tankers and Dealing with Its
Implications in the Wake of the Reform of EC Regulation 44/2001' (2010) Journal of Private
International Law 281, 283.
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The CJEU, first, found that the Regulation did apply to situations such as that
occurred in West Tankers. Secondly, it stated that the use of an anti-suit injunction
to prevent a court of a Member State, which normally has jurisdiction to resolve a
dispute under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation, from ruling, in accordance
with Article 1(2)(d) of that regulation, on the very applicability of the regulation
to the dispute brought before it, necessarily amounts to stripping that court of
the power to rule on its own jurisdiction.4 In addition, it found that an anti-suit
injunction runs counter to the trust which the Member States accord to one
another's legal systems and judicial institutions, if it obstructs the court of another
Member State in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Regulation.
41
Citing Gasser and Overseas Union Insurance and Others 42 the CJEU stated that "in no
case is a court of one Member State in a better position to determine whether the
court of another Member State has jurisdiction" .43 Further, the CJEU clearly ruled
that counter-measures to parallel proceedings, such as anti-suit injunctions, do not
comply with provisions of the Regulation.
It is evident that West Tankers does not affect the ability of international arbitral
tribunals to grant anti-suit injunctions, neither affects the issuance of anti-suit
injunctions in aid of arbitration in non-EU Member States. However, it freezes the
use of anti-suit injunctions to protect arbitration agreements in the EU (use which
had been fostered by English courts).44 Thus, West Tankers increases the risk that
a party, reluctant to arbitrate, may seek to 'torpedo' a arbitration agreement, by
pre-emptively filing suits elsewhere in Europe. As underlined by Briza:45
"the West Tankers case shows clearly that even after several years of sustained
critique and in the face of all the problems it has caused for practice, the Gasser
logic is still firmly present in the Luxembourg oracle":
and claims that
"one cannot expect any help from the [CJEU] in dealing with practical problems
to which Gasser and its progeny lead".
Again, despite this harsh criticism, it seems that the interpretive solution adopted
by the CJEU is not surprising and can, to some extent, be shared. Anti-suit injunc-
tions are an important common law remedy protect a party's right to arbitrate or
to refer proceedings to a particular court's jurisdiction by defeating competing
40 Paras. 29 et seq.
41Para 30.
Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR 1-3317.
43Para. 29.
" Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New India Assurance Co Ltd
[2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 67, para 65. See Christan Andreas Heinze and Anatol Dutta, "Enforcement
of Arbitration Agreements by Anti-suit Injunctions in Europe - From Turner to West Tankers"
(2007) Yearbook of Private International Law 415.
45Brza (n 23), 546.
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proceedings commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement.46 However, as
underlined by Clifford and Browne," anti-suit injunctions are not granted by the
courts of all the Member States, and it is apparent that the CJEU cannot recognise
(or be influenced by the fact) that the courts of some Member States are less effi-
cient and reliable than others. It is also worth noting that an anti-suit injunction
constitutes an indirect interference in foreign proceedings: this interference could
undermine the effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation in reaching its goals of
ensuring both mutual trust and certainty.48
In addition, again, it is difficult to imagine a different interpretation of the Brussels
I Regulation, and from a more substantive point of view, contractual provisions
cannot prevent parties from bringing court actions. Legal protection must prevail
over private autonomy. As stated by Santomauro:
"the protection of the judicial right to access national courts makes it necessary
that even proceedings outside the scope of the Regulation may not impede other
proceedings that are within the scope and that the arbitration exception is inter-
preted narrowly".'
Brussels I Recast:A legislative Solution to Practical Problems
The prospects for any effective solution of the undeniable detrimental practical
effects brought by CJEU's case law (and compatible with the text of the Brussels
I Regulation) have been considered rather implausible. As regard to the infringe-
ment of arbitration or jurisdiction clauses, the idea of claim for damages for breach
of them has been advocated, but considered unlikely under the current regime.,
A successful handy technique to avoid bypassing of choice of court agreements
has been described as 'suing first' strategy: when an infringed party is aware of the
potential abusive claim of the infringing party and sues the latter first. However,
this practice has a 'dark side': it increases litigation and discourages parties from
finding amicable solutions.
The need for legislative solutions has been widely argued. On 21 April 2009, the
Commission published a Green Paper on the review of the Brussels I Regulation,
46Philippa Charles, "Anti-Suit Injunctions: The ECJ Decision of 10 February 2009 in the West
Tankers Case, International Arbitration Perspective", 5, available at <http://www.maye-
rbrown.com/files/publication/36dbe57b-8b2d-4adb-ala5-b849bb64344f/presentation/
publicationattachment/faal1lf7-5b23-4dd0-a6c4-8a4163b70a34/review internationalarbi-
tration.pdf> (accessed 12 May 2013).
47 Philip Clifford and Oliver Browne, 'Lost at Sea or a Storm in a Teacup? Anti-Suit Injunctions
after Allianz Spa (Formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta Spa) V West Tankers Inc', at <http://
www.google.ie/url?sa-t&rct-j&q-&esrc-s&source-web&cd-2&ved-CCDYQFjAB&url-h
ttp %3A%2F%2Fwww.lw.com%2FthoughtLeadership%2Fanti-suit-injunctions-after-allianz-
spa&ei-YFGiUeGLLsfe7AbuOICQBw&usg-AFQjCNHVYclQXDr7PuhwZXBuvqcZqY7Liw
&bvm-bv.47008514,d.ZG4> (accessed 10 May 2013).
4 Santomauro (n 39), 293.
49 Santomauro (n 39), 293.50Briza (n 23), 548 et seq. Blobel and Spath (n 30), 574 et seq.
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further to a Report on the application of the Brussels I Regulation. A proposal was
then presented in 201051: this was intended to be more than a series of revisions
and amendments. Rather, as underlined by Hay, its purpose was to 'recast' the
existing rules in the context of contemporary conditions and needs. The proposal
underwent much review, amendment and change.5 2 The result Regulation (EU)
No 1215/2012 (Brussels I Recast) was finally adopted after almost three years of
discussion in December 2012, and will enter into force on January 2015.
It is useful to highlight that the Brussels I Recast, among other things, addresses
abuses of the lis pendens rule. The spread of choice of court agreements, along with
the parallel growth of international arbitration, is now understood as particularly
positive and deserves to be protected.
Recital 19 (repeating Recital 14 of the current Regulation) refers to respecting
the autonomy of the parties. Recital 22 of the Preamble provides that 'in order
to enhance the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements and to avoid
abusive litigation tactics, it is necessary to provide for an exception to the general
lis pendens rule in order to deal satisfactorily with a particular situation in which
concurrent proceedings may arise. This is the situation where a court not desig-
nated in an exclusive choice-of- court agreement has been seised of proceedings
and the designated court is seised subsequently of proceedings involving the same
cause of action and between the same parties'.
The new lis pendens rules (provided for in Articles 29 to 34) tackle the problem of
abusive tactics. Particularly relevant in this respect is Article 31. This provision,
at para 1, provides that "where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of
several courts, any court other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction
in favour of that court". This would be relevant to claims concerning a number of
issues which might for example fall within several heads of the exclusive juris-
diction rules in existing Article 22, especially in the field of patent (new Article
24). Article 31(2) provides that any court other than the chosen court "shall stay
the proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement
declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement". It appears that 'torpedo'
claims are forestalled by giving precedence to the chosen court.
The rules relating to jurisdiction and 'choice of court' agreements have been
amended too. Article 25(5) expressly states that jurisdiction agreements are
separable: it provides that jurisdiction agreements "shall be treated as an agree-
ment independent of the other terms of the contract". The Brussels I Regulation
also provides currently that the validity of the jurisdiction agreement cannot be
51European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (Recast), COM(2010) 748 final. On the proposal see inter alia Pamela
Kiesselbach, "The Brussels I Review Proposal - An Overview", in Eva Lein, The Brussels I
Review Uncovered (BIICL, 2012) 1.
"Peter Hay, "Notes on the European Union's Brussels-I 'Recast' Regulation"' (2013) The
European Legal Forum, 1, at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2267816 (accessed 26 May 2012).
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contested solely on the ground that the contract is not valid.5 3 Notably, Brussels
I Recast has slightly widened the scope of jurisdiction agreements, by removing
the requirement that such an agreement needs at least one party domiciled in a
Member State. As noted by practitioners, this relaxation means that the domicile
of the parties to such an agreement is irrelevant and makes it easier to establish
whether the Brussels I Regulation is applicable, by avoiding the need for a detailed
investigation into the domicile of parties.5 4
Brussels I Recast has harmonised the conflicts of law rule on the substantive validity
of choice of court agreements. Article 25 contains a new caveat to the founding of
jurisdiction according to which the Member State court named in a jurisdiction
clause govern questions of substantive validity of the jurisdiction clause itself,
even if that is different from the governing law of the contract. However, it is still
to early to detect how this rule will really operate.
One of the most controversial aspects of the reform process emerged in relation to
the scope of the arbitration exclusion at Article 1(2)(d). While the Heidelberg Report
suggested the removal of the arbitration exception,55 the Brussels I Recast main-
tains the arbitration exclusion. Moreover, this exception is reinforced by Recital 12,
which states:
"nothing in this Regulation should prevent courts of a Member State, when
seised of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have entered into
an arbitration agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from staying
or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining whether the arbitration agree-
ment is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in accord-
ance with their national law".
This means that a party may seek an order from the court seised dismissing the
proceedings before it, and ordering the dispute to be referred back to arbitration.
Recital 12 expressly excludes certain judgments on arbitration agreements from
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation:
"A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should
not be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Reg-
ulation, regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as
an incidental question".
This paragraph clarifies that a court's decision upholding or setting aside an arbi-
tration agreement is not binding upon courts of other Member States. Thus, it
53 Http: / /www.allenovery.com/publications/ en-gb /Pages/ Reform-of -the-Brussels-
Regulation-are-we-nearly-there-yet.aspx (accessed 26 May 2012).
54Http: / /www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Reform-of-the-Brussels-
Regulation-are-we-nearly-there-yet.aspx (accessed 26 May 2012).
55See n 12.
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reduces the scope for tactical litigation in this area, and the worst effects of West
Tankers are loosened. Recital 12 also provides that:
"where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under this Regulation
or under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement is null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this should not preclude that
court's judgment on the substance of the matter from being recognized or, as the
case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation. This should be with-
out prejudice to the competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with the New
York Convention, which takes precedence over this Regulation".
This solution does not prejudice recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
under the New York Convention, which takes precedence over the Brussels I Recast
and should limit the scope for the circulation within Member States of inconsistent
judgments made in respect of certain arbitration matters.
All in all, these amendments relating to arbitration seem to purport some clarity in
respect of the scope of the exclusion of arbitration from Brussels I. Notably, the new
provisions do not authorise a Member State court to grant an anti-suit injunction,
because this would breach the principle of mutual trust which still is at the core
of the regulation. This, according to many commentators, 6 still allows 'torpedo'
claims.
Concluding Remarks
The amendments adopted by the Brussels I Recast seem to offer a viable solution to
overcome the detrimental practical effects arisen further to CJEU case law.
In the current EU scenario of judicial cooperation, the new regulation finds a balance
between the need of trust and co-operation (instead of intervention) between
Member States and the effective protection of party autonomy in individual cases.
However, there is a compelling need to overcome fragmentation and disomoge-
neity among the legal systems. In addition, it might be argued that aggressive
litigation tactics are not likely to disappear. Selection of jurisdiction will remain
subject to tactical planning, considering the difference in speed of the procedure,
the professional background and skills of judges, legal costs, and the likelihood of
a court giving out a friendly verdict in a particular matter. Even if it will be more
difficult under Brussels I Recast to bypass choice of court agreements and com-
mence 'torpedo' claims, the need to ensure the best and most effective defence or
strategy to clients will probably lead to the development other aggressive litigation
tactics.
56Nielsen (n 2) 511.

